

Qiaoxi Zhang

Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial
Facultad de Ciencias Físicas y Matemáticas
Av. República 701
Santiago, Región Metropolitana, Chile

+56 9 72925603
qzhang@dii.uchile.cl
<http://www.dii.uchile.cl/~qzhang/>

Employment

Postdoctoral fellow, 2016 - present, Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile

Education

Ph.D. in Social Science, 2011-2016, California Institute of Technology

M.S. in Social Science, 2011-2013, California Institute of Technology

Bachelor of Economics, 2008-2011, The University of Hong Kong

Fields of Interest

Game theory, Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy

Research Papers

“Vagueness in Multi-issue Proposals” (Submitted)

Abstract: This paper studies how agents choose to be vague in their proposals in a delegation environment. Two agents compete for the approval of a decision maker to implement a multi-dimensional action. Based on their knowledge of the consequences of actions, agents propose future actions but can be vague about any dimension. The decision maker, uncertain about the consequences of actions, chooses one agent to act. I show that vagueness on the dimension where one stands closer to the decision maker than his opponent preserves such an advantage, while preciseness undermines it. Vagueness therefore tends to occur on agents’ advantageous dimensions.

“Biased Updating in Dynamic Experimentation”

Abstract: There is ample evidence that people overestimate the control they have over stochastic outcomes. In this model, I demonstrate the consequence of this bias in a situation where an agent learns about the profitability of an action by taking it repeatedly, i.e. experimenting. The agent may or may not have control over the profitability of the action, which is to be learnt. I show that the bias leads to a lower incentive to experiment. Moreover, the bias may cause the “near-miss effect,” where a failure perceived as close to a success results in a higher incentive to experiment.

“Matching with Incomplete Information”

Abstract: I examine Roth (1989)’s model of matching with incomplete information about others’ preferences and suggest a variation of the proof for the following theorem: no mechanism always produces a matching stable with respect to true preferences. I also show that for any stable revelation matching mechanism, there exists some state of information for which in all equilibria of the induced matching game, the outcome is “truly unstable” in some state realization. Therefore, the outcome is unstable with respect to true preferences and more importantly, the information released through the matching outcome is sufficient for some players in a blocking pair to realize their ability to block.

Professional Activities

Seminars: Universidad Alberto Hurtado (scheduled), MIPP UChile, ACGO UChile, Istanbul Institute of Technology, NYU Abu Dhabi, Nazarbayev University

LACEA-LAMES, Universidad EAFIT, 2016

18th Southwest Economic Theory Conference, UC Riverside, 2016

16th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, IMPA, 2016 (accepted)

27th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, 2016 (accepted)

Honors, Fellowships and Awards

FONDECYT Postdoctorate Contest 2017-2020

Graduate Fellowship, Caltech, 2011-2016

Foundation Scholarship for Outstanding Mainland Students, HKU, 2008-2011

Provost Honors, UC San Diego, 2010

Worldwide Undergraduate Student Exchange Scholarship, HKU, 2009-2010

Dean’s Honours List, HKU, 2009-2010

1st Runner Up, JPMorgan University Fantasy Fund Manager, 2009

Teaching

Ps/Ec 172 – Game Theory (Teaching Assistant to Pietro Ortoleva and Matt Elliott)

BEM 111 – Quantitative Risk Management (Teaching Assistant to Ken Winston)

BEM 104 – Investments (Teaching Assistant to Ben Gillen)

BEM 102 – Introduction to Accounting (Teaching Assistant to Shiing-wu Wang)